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This paper examines a three-period model of an investment decision in a network industry 
characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation 
we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to invest early as well as the 
underlying overall welfare output. In a regulated environment, we first consider a monopolist facing no 
downstream competition but subject to a price cap on the downstream retail (final good) market. We 
identify the welfare-maximising regulated prices using the unregulated market output as a benchmark. 
In particular, we show that the optimal regulation depends on market conditions (that is, the nature of 
demand) and there are three possible outcomes: (i) price regulation does not improve welfare; (ii) 
regulated prices include an option to delay value and provide a positive payoff to the firm; and (iii) 
regulated prices yield a zero payoff to the firm. Second, we consider a vertically integrated network 
provider that is required to provide access to downstream competitors. We show that when the 
regulator has only one instrument, namely the access price, an option-to-delay pricing rule generates 
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Abstract: This paper examines a three-period model of an investment decision in a network 
industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the 
absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to 
invest early as well as the underlying overall welfare output. In a regulated environment, we first 
consider a monopolist facing no downstream competition but subject to a price cap on the 
downstream retail (final good) market. We identify the welfare-maximising regulated prices using 
the unregulated market output as a benchmark. In particular, we show that the optimal regulation 
depends on market conditions (that is, the nature of demand) and there are three possible 
outcomes: (i) price regulation does not improve welfare; (ii) regulated prices include an option to 
delay value and provide a positive payoff to the firm; and (iii) regulated prices yield a zero payoff 
to the firm. Second, we consider a vertically integrated network provider that is required to 
provide access to downstream competitors. We show that when the regulator has only one 
ment, namely the access price, an option-to-delay pricing rule generates (weakly) higher  instru
welfare than the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), except under very specific conditions.  
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The role of monopoly price regulation has experienced a significant shift in many countries. At its 
inception, following a wave of corporatisation and privatisation of government owned enterprises, 
price regulation was designed to promote static efficiency through the establishment of cost 
reduction mechanisms in an environment where capacity constraints were lax in many industries. 
Despite the development of several distinct regulatory methodologies, prices have by and large 
been set in order to secure a zero net present value (NPV) for regulated firms.
1  
 
However, sustained economic growth over the past decade as well as substantial technological 
change in industries such as telecommunications have created an environment where significant 
amounts of investment are necessary to provide new services or update existing ones. 
Consequently, a second wave of regulatory reform across the world has shifted the focus of price 
regulation from promoting static efficiency towards supporting dynamic efficiency and, 
consequently, providing appropriate investment incentives. 
 
The tension between price regulation and investment incentives is highlighted, for example, in the 
current debate on the deployment of fibre-optic infrastructure and so-called Next Generation 
Networks (NGNs). This debate is characterised by firms requiring regulatory certainty before they 
invest in order to avoid circumstances in which they would be required to provide access to the 
new infrastructure at prices that would yield a zero net present value if the new service is 
successful, but access seekers would not share the losses if the new service fails. It is also 
anticipated that the relationship between price regulation and investment incentives will be 
increasingly important in a low carbon emissions world where substantial amounts of renewable 
and gas-fired micro generation will be introduced into the electricity system. The achievement of 
such change will necessitate significant new investment to adapt and expand existing electricity 
networks, mainly because renewable energy involves site-specific power plants.
2 
 
Although it is not the responsibility of regulators to provide firms with incentives to make particular 
investments (for example in NGNs), it is important that the incentives for efficient investment are 
not distorted. This requires a regulatory framework that correctly accounts for the risks faced by 
firms when investing in a new network facility. These risks are related to the combination of two 
underlying characteristics: (demand) uncertainty and irreversibility. 
 
                                                 
1  For instance, the revenue cap regulation applied to electricity transmission in Australia states that 
regulated firms have a maximum revenue allowance that covers the operating expenses and the return on 
investment, that is, maximum revenue is set to remunerate the cost of capital yielding a zero NPV.  
  2Future cash flows in almost all network industries depend significantly on uncertain events such 
as the evolution of technology, tastes, general economic conditions and natural events as well as 
competition from newly developed close substitutes. While most, if not all, firms in a competitive 
economy arguably face such uncertainty, the combination of demand uncertainty and large 
irreversible investments are important characteristics of network industries. If the investments 
were reversible in the case of insufficient cash flows to cover the capital costs, an investor would 
be able to recover any losses through the resale of its assets. Similarly, the irreversibility concept 
would be of less concern in the absence of uncertainty. 
 
Investments in network industries are irreversible for two main reasons. Firstly, for some types of 
investment, recovery through resale is simply not possible. For example, in telecommunications it 
is not economically viable to remove and resell copper or fibre-optic cable that has been placed 
underground. Secondly, even if certain equipment can be uninstalled and resold, it is likely to be 
industry-specific and thus its value dependent on the economic conditions of the industry. Even if 
a firm wanted to resell an asset, it is unlikely that other firms would be willing to buy the 
equipment, particularly at a price that recovered the investment made.
3 
 
The combination of uncertainty, irreversibility and investment timing flexibility provides the 
building blocks of the option to delay theory. Although the option to delay’s concept has been 
extensively studied in competitive markets,
4 its implications on regulated prices and investment 
incentives are less well understood. Indeed, there has been much debate on this subject recently.  
 
For instance, in the context of telecommunications, the New Zealand Commerce Commission 
stated that “the obligation to provide interconnection services removes the option for access 
providers to delay investment in their fixed Public Switched Telephone Networks.
5 If this option 
has a value, the costs of foregoing the option are a cost that should be reflected in 
interconnection prices” (Commerce Commission 2002). In its latest cost of capital consultation, 
the telecommunications regulator in the United Kingdom proposed that “Ofcom should begin to 
develop a framework by which regulatory policy might reflect the value of these options (real 
options)” and “a key area identified by Ofcom as being one in which the value of wait and see 
options might be significant was that of next generation access networks” (Ofcom 2005).  
 
Under real options theory, a firm will invest in a project today if its NPV is higher or equal then the 
NPV of investing at anytime in the future. Therefore, as a result of such options to delay, profit-
                                                                                                                                                   
2 A site-specific power plant is an electric generating facility that can be only built in one specific location 
due to natural conditions. For example, a hydro power plant or wind farm.  
3 See, for example, Pindyck (2004). 
4 See, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996). 
5 A Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) is the traditional phone system. Also referred to as the 
'landline' network, it uses a copper wire network to carry voice and data.  
  3maximising firms might choose not to undertake an investment even though its NPV is positive. In 
these cases, it follows that a regulator who sets the price so that to ensure that the NPV is equal 
to zero will distort the firm’s investment decision. As a result, traditional regulation, which focuses 
on setting the price at some notion of long run average cost so that the NPV of the investment is 
zero, might not provide the correct investment incentives as it fails to take into account the cost of 
uncertainty that the firm has to bear if it were to invest early.  
 
In this paper we examine a simple three-period model of an investment decision in a network 
industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In this model 
a firm may invest in the first period or wait until the second period to decide whether to invest in 
the network. Uncertainty does not resolve itself until the last period.  
 
In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions (i.e., the nature of demand) under 
which an unregulated monopolist decides to invest early as well as the underlying overall welfare 
output. The unregulated monopoly outcome is then set as the benchmark that the regulator will 
try to improve upon.  
 
We first consider a monopolist firm facing no downstream competition but subject to a price cap 
on the downstream retail (final good) market. Our focus is on regulatory interventions where the 
regulator commits ex-ante to a set of prices that are not contingent on demand.
  6  Thus, our 
‘regulatory game’ is such that the regulator makes a one-off offer and the firm then decides 
whether to invest early or not. We rule out the regulator’s ability to commit to demand contingent 
prices. Such commitment might not be possible as a result of political pressures that emerge 
when the realised state of demand calls for high prices in order to be consistent with full capital 
maintenance. This is the well-known regulatory expropriation problem.    
 
In this ex-ante regulated environment, we identify the welfare-maximising regulated prices. In 
particular, we show that there are three possible optimal scenarios: regulated prices that provide 
a zero payoff to the firm, regulated prices that include an option to delay value and provide a 
positive payoff to the firm and no regulation. From a policy perspective, this indicates that 
regulated prices that exclude an option to delay and that are designed to yield zero economic 
profits might not be optimal. 
 
We also consider a vertically integrated network provider that is required to provide access to 
downstream competitors. We show that when the regulator has only one instrument, namely the 
access price, an option-to-delay pricing rule generates (weakly) higher welfare than the Efficient 
Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), except under very specific circumstances.  
                                                 
6 Another possible type of ex-ante regulation for new network services is the notion of a ‘regulatory 
holiday’. See Hausman (1999). 
  4 
The basic idea is that access prices under the option-to-delay pricing rule are (weakly) lower than 
those following the ECPR. The main reason is that under an option-to-delay pricing rule, even an 
inefficient entrant can constraint the monopoly rents that the incumbent can extract, whereas an 
ECPR price embeds full monopoly rents.  
 
As we discuss in the next section, this paper differs from earlier literature in at least three 
significant aspects. First, it explicitly considers the process by which a regulator sets regulated 
prices. Second, it shows that the design of welfare-maximising price regulation depends on 
market conditions. Third, it investigates optimal access pricing and unlike Pindyck (2004) who 
advocates an ECPR-type methodology, we find that except under very specific conditions, an 
access price that accounts for the option to delay value is welfare-superior to the ECPR. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the recent literature on regulation and the 
option to delay. Section 3 sets out the investment decision model in an unregulated industry. In 
Section 4 we compute the NPV and the option to delay value associated with the unregulated 
monopolist investment decision. Section 5 investigates the effect of retail price regulation in the 
incentives to invest. In Section 6 we examine the effects of access price regulation on the firm’s 
investment decision under downstream competition and compare two types of regulation, namely 
those based on the ECPR and those based on an option to delay rule. Section 7 concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
One of the earliest set of papers related to this topic was Teisberg (1993 and 1994). Both articles 
focus on a firm’s decision to delay investment, choose shorter-lead-time technologies (even if 
they are more expensive) and abandon partially completed projects when this firm is faced with 
uncertain and asymmetric profit and loss restrictions due to regulation.  
 
The value to the firm of the investment project is a function of the uncertain value of a completed 
project in the future and the direct costs of completing construction. The value to the firm of a 
completed project depends on exogenous regulatory treatments of cost allowances, financing 
costs and abandoned projects.  
 
The analysis uses a stylized representation of exogenous cost allowance policy. The value of an 
already completed project is assumed to be known. However, the value of a project that is not yet 
complete is uncertain. The expected change on the project’s value is the expected rate of return 
on an operating project less a regulatory term representing expected changes in cost allowances. 
  5Future uncertainty about the value of a completed project is due to future regulatory outcomes as 
well as future market conditions.  
 
The modelling framework used in both papers also assumes that the financing cost policy is such 
that the investment generates no positive cash flows until it is completed. Finally, a stylised 
abandonment policy is considered, in which the firm recovers an exogenously specified fraction of 
previously sunk costs when the project is abandoned.  
 
Teisberg (1993) shows that when the firm faces uncertain and asymmetric profit and loss 
restrictions it invests in smaller, shorter-lead-time plants, or simply delay investment. Firms 
choose smaller projects to reduce the expected size of regulatory penalties and shorter-lead-time 
projects to reduce the chance that the realised usefulness of the plant due to regulatory 
uncertainty will be very different from the original expectations. Decisions to delay investment 
also result from asymmetric profit and loss restrictions. 
 
Teisberg (1994) provides a numerical analysis of optimal construction strategies based on the 
model developed in Teisberg (1993). The analysis presents four results: the value of flexibility to 
delay or abandon construction, the effects of uncertainty on the project value and on the decision 
threshold for investment, the value of a shorter construction lead time (shorter lead time 
technology), and the effects of abandonment policy. It shows, for instance, that the value of the 
options to delay and abandon construction may be very substantial. Also, it shows that the value 
of the investment project under regulation is lower than in an unregulated case and the more 
uncertainty there is, the more regulation reduces the investment project’s value. 
 
It follows from Teisberg (1993, 1994) that the project’s value under regulation is lower than in its 
absence. As a result, regulation might lead a firm to delay its investment.  As in Teisberg, we 
develop a model that compares the investment decision of an unregulated monopolist and a firm 
that is subject to price regulation. However, we explicitly consider the process by which the 
regulator sets regulated prices and characterise the socially optimal price regulation.  
 
Other important references include those by Hausman (1999) and Hausman and Myers (2002).  
While Teisberg investigates the impact of regulatory uncertainty on firm’s investment decisions, 
these authors focus on access pricing methodologies and asymmetric rights between incumbent 
and entrants in the telecommunications and railroad industries. Moreover, they argue that 
regulated prices in these industries should reflect the importance of sunk costs and the 
irreversibility of investments. 
 
  6In particular, Hausman (1999) argues that the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the form 
of its access pricing methodology (TSLRIC)
  7 can lead to serious negative effects on innovation 
and new investment in the local telephone network because it does not account for the interaction 
of uncertainty with sunk and irreversible costs of investment. The author concludes that a mark 
up factor must be applied to the investment cost component of TSLRIC. Hausman points out that 
this mark up is the value of the free option that regulators force incumbent providers to grant to 
new entrants, where an option is the right but not the obligation to purchase the use of the 
unbundled elements of the incumbent’s network.  
 
Hausman and Myers (2002) make the same point as Hausman (1999) but their focus is on the 
railroad industry. The authors estimate the size of the differences between the returns calculated 
using the regulator’s pricing methodology and an alternative method that includes the interaction 
of uncertainty with sunk and irreversible costs of investment by applying a real options approach 
(using Monte Carlo Simulation). They find that the required return calculated from a regulator’s 
model ignoring these factors is lower than the optimal amount; the size of the error vis-à-vis the 
optimal amount lies between 30% and 84.4%.  
 
As in Hausman (1999) and Hausman and Myers (2002) we investigate access pricing in the 
context of infrastructure investment. However, we explicitly determine an access pricing policy 
that accounts for the option to delay value. Moreover, we show that the format that the welfare-
maximising price regulation will take depends on market condition.    
 
Finally, Pindyck (2004) address the impact of the network sharing arrangements mandated by the 
U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 on investment incentives, with a focus on the implications 
of irreversible investment. As in Hausman (1999), Pindyck argues that because the entrant does 
not bear the sunk costs, this leads to an asymmetric allocation of risk and return that is not 
properly accounted for in the pricing of the network services. Pindyck argues that such 
asymmetric allocation of risk and return creates a significant investment disincentive.  
 
In contrast with Hausman (1999), Pindyck (2004) investigates the relationship between regulation 
and uncertainty by using discrete modelling frameworks. More specifically, Pindyck (2004) 
considers two distinct frameworks to analyse the link between the option to delay and regulated 
prices.  
 
The first framework consists of a single firm assessing a network investment that will generate 
cash flows in perpetuity. The firm can invest in the first period or wait until the second period to 
                                                 
7  TSLRIC (Total Service Long-Run Incremental Cost) is a cost-based pricing methodology reflecting 
"forward-looking costs" of an efficient operator, comprising direct costs, the cost of capital, and a share of 
common costs.  
  7decide whether to invest in the network. The cash flow in the first period is known, but the cash 
flow in the second period can either increase or decrease. This uncertainty is resolved in the 
second period and from there onwards the same cash flow (high or low) will eventuate each year. 
The required investment amount is unchanged from the first to the second period – that is, the 
real cost of investment decreases over time. Thus, the combination of uncertain cash flows and a 
declining investment requirement in real terms creates an incentive for the firm to delay. The cost 
of waiting is the first period cash flow, which is foregone when the firm delays its investment. This 
framework is used to explain the basic concept of option value. Additionally, in order to illustrate 
the problem of ex post access regulation, Pindyck uses a numerical example of irrational 
behaviour by a firm; that is, it is optimal to wait but the firm invests early nonetheless. Pindyck 
then uses this example to show that under a low demand scenario the incumbent firm has a 
negative payoff while the entrant avoids any losses by not taking up access to the network. 
Pindyck suggests that access prices should incorporate an option to delay value to compensate 
the incumbent for this asymmetric risk.  
 
Pindyck also examines a hypothetical example where an incumbent installs a 
telecommunications switch that can be utilized by an entrant. As in the previous example, it is 
optimal for the incumbent to wait until uncertainty is resolved but the firm invests anyway. In this 
example, the author suggests that this would be the case where the investment is mandatory and 
the firm has a duty to serve. Pindyck shows that when there is entry, the entrant’s expected gain 
is precisely the incumbent’s expected loss. In order to correct access prices to account for the 
option to delay value, Pindyck suggests that the entrant’s expected cash flow should be set equal 
to zero and consequently the incumbent would be indifferent between providing access to 
entrants and providing the retail service itself (an ECPR-type methodology).  
 
As in Pindyck (2004) we use a three period model to investigate access pricing in the context of 
infrastructure investment. However, our modelling framework differs from Pindyck’s in several 
ways. First, in our model the cash flow in the first period is uncertain whereas this amount is 
known in Pindyck’s model. Second, in our framework uncertainty does not resolve itself until the 
last period while in Pindyck (2004) uncertainty is resolved in the second period. Finally, in order to 
isolate the effect of demand uncertainty on the option to delay value we consider that the 
investment outlay is financially neutral over time. In Pindyck (2004) the real cost of investment 
decreases over time. 
 
Importantly, while Pindyck advocates in favour of an ECPR-type methodology to account for the 
interaction between irreversibility and demand uncertainty, we find that, except under very 
specific conditions, an access price that accounts for the option to delay value generates at least 
the same welfare than an ECPR-based price.   
                                                                                                                                                   
 
  8 
3. The Investment Decision Model 
 
This Section develops a simple three-period model framework to investigate the role of the option 
to delay on investment decisions in network industries. Our framework encompasses four 
common characteristics of network industries: timing flexibility when making the investment 
decision, demand uncertainty, investment irreversibility and natural monopoly.    
 
We consider a firm’s decision regarding whether to build a network in order to provide a new 
service. It takes one period to build the network. The firm can build the network at   or at 
, with services starting at   or 
0 = t
1 = t 1 = t 2 = t , respectively. If the firm does not invest at  0 = t , it 
has the right but not the obligation to invest at  1 = t . If the firm invests at  , it will have the 
cash flows from periods   and 
0 = t
1 = t 2 = t
2 = t
. On the other hand, if the firm invests at   it will only 
get the cash flow from period  . Thus, there is a cost of waiting when the firm delays its 
investment (the first period cash flow). Also, we assume that when indifferent as to investing, the 
firm invests and when indifferent between investing at 
1 = t
0 = t  or at  1 = t , the firm invests at  0 = t . 
 
The investment outlay to build the network at  0 = t  is equal to I , whereas the outlay to build it at  
 is equal to  , where   is the project’s cost of capital. Thus, the investment 
expenditure is financially neutral over time. Moreover, the investment is sunk and there are no 
maintenance or operational costs to run the network. 
1 = t () I k + 1 k
 
At   the inverse demand function is characterized by a choke price equal to  . At any price 
below or equal to   the demand, denoted  by  , will be either equal to   (where ) or 
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expected demand at  . The demand at a price above   is always equal to zero.  0 = t
  9 
At   the inverse demand function is characterized by a choke price equal to  . At any price 
below or equal to   the demand, denoted by  , will be either equal to  ,  or   
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Under these conditions, the gross value of future cash inflows will fluctuate in line with the 
random fluctuations in demand (Figure 1). Note that demand uncertainty creates an incentive for 
the firm to delay its investment decision until  1 = t .  Note also that this uncertainty does not 
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2 = t 0 = t  
 Figure 1 
 
The network is used to provide services to final consumers. The technology is such that the 
production of the final good requires one unit of the network service and one unit of a generic 
input with unit prices   at   and   at  1 c 1 = t 2 c 2 = t . Therefore, at  0 = t  the firm’s cost function to 
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  10where   and   are the cost functions when investing at  0 C 1 C 0 = t  and at  , respectively, 
evaluated at time  . It is clear from (1) that the provision of network services constitutes a 




In the next section we analyse the investment decision of an unregulated monopolist who does 
not anticipate that its prices will be regulated. 
  
4. Pricing the NPV and the Option to Delay in the 
Absence of Regulation 
 
An unregulated monopolist is considering whether to invest in a network facility to provide a new 
service. When making its investment decision, this firm knows the choke prices consumers would 
pay for its new service as well as the expected demand under the alternative states of the world. 
At this stage, the monopolist does not anticipate that its prices will be regulated. 
 
First, we calculate this investment decision as a standard NPV. Note that if the firm invests at 
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Financial theory suggests that the cost of capital of a project is determined by its cash flows’ risk 
profile. Remember that the future cash inflows will fluctuate in line with the random fluctuations in 
demand. In particular, recall that demand at each period equals the demand from the previous 
period multiplied by u  or   with probabilities θ  and ( ) d −θ 1
() ( k d u + = − + 1 1
. It follows then that 
) θ θ . 
 
  11Thus, discounting the  () θ NV
I Q − ⎥
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⎤
 at the opportunity cost of capital   we obtain a NPV equal to 
. The same NPV can be calculated using a risk-neutral valuation. In 
a risk-neutral world, all assets would earn the risk-free return 
k


















r , and so expected cash flows 
(weighted by the risk-neutral probabilities,  p and  ( ) p − 1 ) could be appropriately discounted at 
the risk-free rate. The risk-neutral probability is stated in Lemma 1 below. The proof of the 
Lemma is in the Appendix. 
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Given the values of the parameters, the NPV is fixed at  NPV . In the next section we will 
calculate the changes in the NPV as prices are set by the regulator rather than the firm. 
 
The risk-neutral methodology will now be used to calculate this investment decision as a call 
option, that is, if the firm does not invest at  0 = t  it has the right but not the obligation to invest at 
. The rationale for using the risk-neutral methodology can be explained as follows. As the 
cash flows risk profile of the deferral option is different from the standard NPV, these cash flows 
cannot be discounted using the same cost of capital   as in the NPV case. Thus, instead of 
1 = t
k
  12calculating the correct risk-adjusted discount rate applied to the expected cash flows from the 
project (given deferral), we simply calculate the risk-neutral probabilities and then discount the 
cash flows using the risk free rate.
8 
 
Note from Figure 2 below that (i) the benefit of waiting is that the firm avoids negative payoffs and 
(ii) the cost of waiting is the first period cash flow, which is foregone when the firm delays its 
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The expected return on the option, denoted by  ,  must also equal the risk-free rate in a risk-


















































  (3) 
 
It is easy to see from (3) that the option to delay only has value when  . Since our goal is 
to investigate the relation between the option to delay and regulation we assume throughout the 
paper that this inequality holds. Note also from (3) that when considering the option to delay (OD) 
as a function of demand, there are three ranges that play an important role in our analysis. In the 
first range, both states of demand, high and low, yield negative payoffs. In this case the option to 
delay is equal to zero. In the second range only the high demand scenario yields a positive payoff 
2
_
2 c P >
                                                 
8 A more formal rationale is provided by Teisberg (1994) who points out that in an option pricing model 
the value of the investment opportunity is derived from the market value of the project. This implies that 
the riskless rate, rather than the cost of capital, should be used in the valuation of the investment as the risk 
of the project is incorporated in the market valuation of the project. It follows then that the cost of capital is 
exogenous and any changes in its value are captured by the market value of the project. 













. In the third range, both scenarios yield positive 
payoffs and the slope of the function is  . As with the NPV, given parameter values, 














In order to decide whether, and when, to invest in the network facility the firm must compare the 





9 Recall that the benefit of 
waiting is that the firm avoids negative payoffs while the cost of waiting is the first period cash 
flow, which is foregone when the firm delays its investment. Thus, it is clear that the comparison 
between the market value of the   and the   at 
______
NPV 0 = t depends on  , the term 
that drives the first period net revenue. There are four different possibilities depending on the 
magnitude of this term, which are listed in Lemma 2. Its proof and figures covering the various 










Lemma 2: Table 1 below summarizes the unregulated monopolist investment decision outputs 









Condition  The firm never 
invests if  
The firm invests at  1 = t  when 
uQ q = 1  if  
The firm always 
invests at   if   1 = t
The firm invests at  0 = t  if 
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9 Clearly, NPV is the net present value of investing at  0 = t  and OD is the net present value of investing at 
.   1 = t
  14 
Lemma 2 shows how market conditions (choke prices and expected demand) affect the firm’s 
investment decision. It remains for us to compute the total welfare associated with each decision. 
First, if the firm invests at   ( ) the total welfare at  0 = t
____ ______
OD NPV ≥ 0 = t  is given by: 
 
______
0 NPV WM α =                      (4) 
 
where  1 < α  denotes the weight assigned to firm’s profits. Second, if the firm invests at  1 = t  
independently of the demand scenario ( ,   and  ) the total welfare 
at   is given by:  
____ ______
OD NPV < 0 >























Finally, if the firm invests at   only in case demands turns out to be high ( , 
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⎥ − denotes the present value of profits when the firm invests at 




5. Retail Price Regulation 
 
This section investigates the effect of retail price regulation on the incentives to invest. More 
specifically, we consider a monopolist firm that faces no downstream competition and is subject 
to a price cap on the downstream retail (final good) market. The regulator and the firm both 





  15uncertainty and the cost function. The regulator sets regulated prices   and   that will prevail 
at   and at  , respectively, in order to maximize total welfare: 
R P 1
R P2
1 = t 2 = t
 
R Max W CS απ = +                   (7) 
 




This paper departs from most of the modern literature on regulation (Laffont and Tirole 1993) by 
abstracting from the existence of asymmetric information between the regulated firm and 
regulator. Our focus is instead on a situation where the costs of the project (I ) can be 
determined with certainty. Perhaps our model can be seen as a reduced form approach where 
the regulated firm puts in a claim regarding the cost of the project and the regulator decides 
accurately the amount that it will allow the firm to recover through regulated prices.
11 Moreover, 
our focus is on a specific investment to provide a new service, for instance, a new technology in 
the telecom industry. In such cases the investment is subject to scrutiny by audit firms hired by 
the regulator, by society at large and also by potential competitors. This additional scrutiny may 
mitigate the existence of asymmetric information vis-à-vis the more standard case where a 
regulated monopolist undertakes a marginal investment, which is only subject to the scrutiny of 
the regulator.  
 
Our focus is on ex ante regulation. That is, we assume that the regulator sets   and   at 
 before the resolution of demand uncertainty. Although it is true that a regulator could 
extract the entire surplus by offering an ex post demand contingent price contract, we assume 
that a regulator cannot commit to such contract. This assumption is consistent with regulatory 
practice around the world. Moreover, it suffices there to be a small probability that, ex post, the 
regulator will renege on the promise of a high retail price (e.g., if demand turns out to be low) for 







Thus, we focus on a ‘regulatory game’ where the regulator makes a one-off offer which consists 
of ex ante non-demand contingent maximum prices   and   that the firm will be allowed to 
R P 1
R P2
                                                 
10 In our set up the horizontal demand implies that when  1 = α  any reduction in the firm’s profit (through 
lower prices) would be equal to an equivalent increase in the consumer surplus. Thus, when  1 = α  in our 
model, a regulator cannot improve upon the outcome of the unregulated market. 
11 For an empirical analysis of the difference between firms’ claims and regulatory cost allowances in 
Australia see Breunig, Hornby, Menezes and Stacey (2006).   
  16charge at   and at  , respectively. The firm then decides whether to invest at   or at 
 (if demand turns out to be high).  
1 = t 2 = t 0 = t
1 = t
 
As we shall demonstrate below, the optimal regulation depends on the impact of the regulated 
prices on the comparison between the Net Present Value and the Option to Delay value. There 
are three cases to consider, where each case corresponds to one of the three different ranges of 
the Option to Delay function in an unregulated market. The next three propositions characterise 
the optimal set of regulated prices for each of these cases. Their proofs and figures covering the 
various cases are in the Appendix. Below we will use the following terminology, 
I
C  denotes 









= 0 = t   for expected demand Q,   is the 







 is the average 






Proposition 1:  Suppose  . If  , the unregulated outcome is 
optimal. If  , the optimal ex ante demand non-contingent price contract is 
 and  . In both cases the firm will invest at  . 
0
____ ______
= ≥ OD NPV
_













R PC =+ 0 = t
 
Proposition 1 characterises the optimal regulated prices when the option to delay value in an 
unregulated market is equal to zero. It is easy to see that when   the best the 
regulator can do is to replicate the choke prices   and  . When  , however, 
the regulator is able to set   and    so that the net present value under regulation 
becomes zero. Since the option to delay value remains unchanged, we have   
and the firm still invests at  . In this case the regulator can extract the entire surplus from the 
firm – by transferring it to the consumer – without distorting the decision of investing at . This 
is socially optimal since the overall welfare function puts a greater weight to the consumer’s 
surplus than the firm’s profit as
0
____ ______




















α .    
 
Note that the sum of   and   is equal to 
R P 1
R P2 ( ) 12 Ccc ++. That is, when  , 
regulated prices that are equal to the average cost but do not  include an option to delay value 
0
____ ______
= > OD NPV
  17provide the socially optimal investment incentives. This is the type of regulation that has been 
applied throughout the word over the last decades. Proposition 1 makes the useful but obvious 
point that standard regulation is optimal when the option to delay has no value.  
 
The next proposition determines the optimal price regulation when the payoff of investing in an 
unregulated market at   under high demand is positive while the payoff in the low demand 
scenario is negative. That is, we look at the case where   and  .  
1 = t
0 >
+ OD 0 =
− OD
 
As we will see below (Proposition 2b), under some circumstances it might not be possible for the 
regulator to extract all the surplus from the firm without distorting the decision of investing at 
. In such cases, the minimum prices that induce the firm to invest early provide an option to 




In such cases, it is also convenient to define a constant  , which is determined implicitly by 
regulation, as the value above the average total cost of investing at 
0 > M
1 = t  (if demand is high) such 
that we have  . This is the price regulation that provides the minimum option to 
delay value to the firm such that it invests early. The price that satisfies this condition is 
____


















. Since we are referring to the second range of the option to delay 
function this price also satisfies the following condition  .  Then, there is 
a value  such that  .  
2 c CL + < 2 P
R < 2 c CH +
> M 22 c M =+ +
 
Proposition 2a: Suppose there is an expected demand level   such that 
 and that the actual expected demand is such that 
,   and   (see Figure 7). The optimal ex ante demand non-
contingent price contract is   and   (the firm invests at  ). 
Q %
__ __
12 12 (, ,) (, ,) 0 NPV P P Q OD P P Q = %
____ ______









1 2 1 2 P c c C
R − + + = 0 = t
  
Proposition 2b: Suppose there is an expected demand level   such that 
,   and   (see Figure 5). When the actual 


































  18ante demand non-contingent price contract is   and 
_
1 1 P P
R = 22
R








>  (the 
firm invests  at   only if demand is high) or   and   if  1 = t
_
1 1 P P
R =
_












≤  (the firm   
invests at  ).  When the actual expected demand Q is such that  ,   
and  , the optimal ex ante demand non-contingent price contract is   and 














R * p p >  (the firm invests  at  1 = t
*
 only if demand turns out to be high) or 
 and   if 
_
1 P = 1 P
R
2 H PC =+ 2 c M +
R p p ≤ (the firm   invests at  ), where  0 = t
() ( )
__







PC M P M Q I
⎧ ⎫
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⎣⎦ = .  
 
Proposition 2a characterises the conditions under which the regulator is able to extract the entire 
profit from the firm without changing its decision of investing at  = t . When there is an expected 
demand such that the net present value and the option to delay value are equal to zero in an 
unregulated market, the regulator can set prices equal to the average total costs (  and 
) and the firm invests at 
_
1 P = 1 P
R
( 1 c )
_
1 P 2 c − + 2 P
R C + = 0 = t . In this case, regulated prices that are 
equal to the average costs but do not include an option to delay value provide the socially optimal 
investment incentives.  
 
Proposition 2b characterises the conditions under which the regulator cannot set prices below a 
certain level without changing the firm’s decision of investing at  0 = t
t
. For instance, to induce the 
firm to invest at   when   the regulator must provide to the firm an option to 
delay value that is equal to the option to delay value in an unregulated market. However, doing so 
might not be socially optimal as the total welfare when the firm invests at   might be higher 








. The reason is that the prices that the 
regulator needs to set to induce the firm to invest at  1 = t
 firm to inve
 are lower than the prices that induce 





In particular,  prices that induce the st at  1 = t  when
 prices, total regulated reve
 demand
nue is
 is high are 
 equal to the  equal to 
_
1 P  and  1
R = P 22 H PCc =+
R . Under these
  19average total costs of investing at  1 = t  and the entire profit ransferred to consumers. 
However, the firm will onl 1
 is t
y invest at  = t  if demand is high. Proposition 2b shows that this 







> here  
______
NPV α  is the firm’s profit when the firm invests 
early -- this is the welfare that is lost when the firm invests at  1 = t
H PC
 -- while   represents the 
d welfa
 
 case optimal 
gulation will be one of the following: (i
H
t p 1 = π
this
M
expected  consumer surplus an  when the firm delays its investment.  
The same rationale can be applied to the case where 
____ ______





1  and 
R
_
1 1 P P
R = P = 22 c = ++ , or (ii)  re  and 
22 H
R PCc =+ . Under (i) the firm invests at  0 = t  (at these prices 
____
OD OD <). Under (ii) 
the firm invests at  1
NPV =
= t  if demand is hig  case  on the probability of 
nd state. For a sufficiently high probability (
h. Which  is optimal dep
*
ends
the high dema p p > te that the 
numerator of  p  is the sum of the consumer surplus generated by prices below market levels 
and 
) (ii) is optimal. No
*
α  multiplied by the firm’s profit, which is equal to the minimum option to delay value such 
that the firm invests early ( OD OD < ). Note that this is the amount that is lost when there is an 
investment delay. However, an investment at  1
____
= t  causes an increase in the consumer surplus 
t 1 =
 
The next propositions characterise the optimal  ation when the payoff of investing in an 
unregulated market at  1 = t  under low demand is positive (i.e., 
such that the expected welfare at this period is eq
 and that t
(se











will see below 
at the optimal regulatory policy in the third ra  of the option to delay function has the same 
tual e cted de such that 
e  re 7). The  timal  and non-
1
0 >




characteristics as seen in the second range of this function.   
 
Proposition 3a: Suppose there is an expected demand Q %  such that 
__ __
12 12 (, ,) (, ,) P P Q OD P P Q == %%
OD NPV > ,  0 > OD  and OD
contingent price contract is 
_
1 1 P P
R =
NPV 0






R PC c cP = ++−  (the firm invests at  0 = t ). 
 
  20 Proposition 3b:  Suppose there is an expected demand   such that 
,   and   and the actual expected demand 
 i s  s u c h  t h a t   ,   and OD (see Figure 5). The optimal ex ante 
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P 1 22 c = +  if 
* p p >
22 c
 (the firm invests  
at   only if demand turns out to be high) or   and  1 = t
_
1 P = 1 P
R R PC H M = ++  if 
* p p ≤ (the 
firm   invests at  ).  0 = t
  
Proposition 3c: Suppose that  ,   and  (see Figure 4). The 
optimal ex ante demand non-contingent price contract is   and   if   
____ ______
OD NPV = 0 >




R = P 22
R
H PCc =+
** p p >
**
, (the firm   invests at t  only if demand is high) or   and   if  1 =
_
1 1 P P
R = 22
R
L PC =+ c







⎡ ⎛ − + ⎜ ⎢ ⎝ ⎣
22 LL PCc Q α
π
⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ −+ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ** p = H
t
+ C Q I
⎧⎫ ⎤ ⎞ − ⎨⎬ ⎟ ⎥ ⎠ ⎦ ⎩⎭ . 
 
Preposition 3a is similar to Proposition 2a. That is, when there is an expected demand such that 
the net present value and the option to delay value are equivalent to zero in an unregulated 
market, the regulator can set prices equal to the average total costs (  and 
) and the firm invests at 
_




1 2 1 2 P c c C P





. In this case, regulated prices that are 
equal to the average costs but do not include an option to delay provide the socially optimal 
investment incentives. Proposition 3b is equivalent to Proposition 2b. That is, when there is an 
expected demand such that the net present value is equal to the option to delay value in the 
second range of the OD function and the actual expected demand is such that the net present 
value is higher than the option to delay value ( ), both conditions holding in an 
unregulated market, the optimal regulation will be one of the following two possibilities: (i) 





1 1 P P
R = 2
R
H PC =+ 2 c M + 1 P
R = 2 H PCc 2 = + . The determination of 
which regulation is optimal depends on the probability of the high demand state. As above, 
approach (ii) is optimal when 
* p p > .  
 
  21Proposition 3c yields a new result. When the choke price in the first period is equal to the 
marginal cost of producing the service at the same period ( ) we have   in the 
third range of the option to delay function (see Figure 4). Then, the minimum prices that induce 
the firm to invest at   are   and 
1
_






1 1 P P
R = 2
R
L PC = + . These prices include an option to 
delay value for the firm. Once more, to determine the optimal regulated prices, one must compare 
these prices with those that induce the firm to invest at  1 = t  under high demand (i.e.,   
and  ). In a similar manner to Proposition 3b above, the latter is optimal when the 
probability of the high demand state is sufficiently high (i.e., 
_




H PCc =+ 2
** p p > ). Note that the numerator of 
 is the sum of the consumer surplus generated by prices below market levels and 
* * p α  
multiplied by the firm’s profit, which is equal to the minimum option to delay value such that the 
firm invests early ( ); this amount is lost when there is an investment delay. However, 
an investment at   causes an increase in the consumer surplus such that the expected 





t p 1 = π
 
Note that  . This follows as the welfare generated by an early investment is higher under 
 and   than under   and 
* * * p p >
R PC
_
1 1 P P
R = 22 H c M =+ +
_
1 1 P P
R = 2
R
L PCc 2 = +
2 c C M L
. The reason is that in 
the first regulation the minimum option to delay value that is necessary to induce the firm to invest 
early is lower than in the second case, that is,  2 c CH + < + + . Under the first price 
setting the regulator is able to extract more profit from the firm without changing its decision of 
investing early.  
 
6. Access Regulation  
 
This Section studies the effect of access price regulation on the firm’s investment decision and 
total welfare. Our benchmark is an unregulated, vertically integrated firm who does not have to 
provide access to its network. This firm invests at  0 = t
2
, charges consumers prices for the new 
service that are equal to   at   and   at 
_
1 P 1 = t
_
2 P = t , and serve the entire demand at these 
prices.  Under the benchmark the incumbent has no incentive to allow access to its network by 
downstream competitors. 
 
  22To consider the effects of access price regulation, we assume that the regulator requires the 
incumbent to provide access to its network and sets the access prices. There are infinitely many 
potential entrants with the same technology as the incumbent and retail unit costs equal to   at 
 and   at 
E c1
1 = t E c2 2 = t . Firms compete à la Bertrand and consumers prefer to buy from the 
incumbent when prices are identical. We focus on two distinct access pricing methodologies: The 
Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Option to Delay Pricing Rule (ODPR). 
 
The important conceptual distinction between the analysis of retail price and access price 
regulation lies on the assumption of an infinite number of potential downstream competitors under 
the latter. When competitors are more efficient retailers than the incumbent, then access price 
regulation can always improve over the outcome of an unregulated monopolist who does not 
need to provide access to its network.  
 
The more interesting and novel result is that even when the incumbent is more efficient than 
entrants, the threat of entry can be used to change the option value of the incumbent under an 
ODPR-based access price, whereas an ECPR-based access price preserves any monopoly 
rents. This means that under some market circumstances and when the probability of the high 
demand state is sufficiently high, we show below that a welfare-maximising regulator might be 
able to reduce the access price to a point where the firm will invest at   to earn a zero 
expected payoff.  
1 = t
 
6.1. The Efficient Component Pricing Rule - ECPR 
 
The ECPR is a regulatory pricing rule that links retail and wholesale prices. It reflects the 
incumbent’s true opportunity cost of selling one unit of access to an entrant and so comprises the 
resource costs of providing access as well as the revenue loss from selling one less unit in the 
retail market. At the ECPR, the incumbent is indifferent between providing access to entrants or 
providing the retail service itself.
12  
 




1 1 c P A
ECPR − =  and     2
_
2 2 c P A
ECPR − =
 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Willig (1979) and Baumol (1983). 
  23At this access prices the incumbent firm would be indifferent between providing access to the 
entrant and receiving   and   or providing the retail service itself and receiving   
and  . Under the ECPR any entrant with retail marginal costs   and   such that 
 can enter the market, provide the retail service and fulfil the entire 
demand at prices    and   such that the sum of the entrant’s net revenue in both 








1 c P −
2
_
2 c P −




( 1 1 c c c E +
= t  is not distorted. This is 
summarised as follows.  
 
Proposition 4: When () ( ) 2 1 2 1 c c c c E E + < +
0
 the ECPR yields higher overall welfare and the 
same investment at   as an unregulated industry that is not required to provide access.  = t
 
Note that when the potential entrant is less efficient than the incumbent (i.e., 
) an ECPR-based access price yields the same outcome as  an 
unregulated monopolist as entry does not take place. 
() ( 2 1 2 1 c c c c E E + ≥ + )
  
6.2 The Option to Delay Pricing Rule - ODPR 
 
We define the access price contract following the Option to Delay Pricing Rule (ODPR) as: 
  
1 1 1 c P A
R ODPR − =  and    2 2 2 c P A
R ODPR − =
 
That is, the access price under ODPR is equal to the difference between the maximizing-welfare 
retail price and the incumbent’s marginal cost at each period. Table 6 in the Appendix shows all 
possible access prices under the ODPR.
13 It follows that access prices under ODPR are lower or 
equal than prices under the ECPR. Thus, we can define a variable   that satisfies  0 ≥ Z
( ) ( ) Z A A A A
ODPR ODPR ECPR ECPR = + − + 2 1 2 1 . That is, 
 
() Z P P P P









1      (8) 
 
Below we show how the outcome under Bertrand competition downstream depends on Z  and on 
the incumbent’s and entrant’s marginal costs.  
  24 
Proposition 5a characterises the market conditions where access prices under the ODPR and 
ECPR are identical while Propositions 5b and 5c characterise the market conditions where 
access prices under ODPR are lower than under the ECPR. In Proposition 5b access prices 
under ODPR are the minimum prices such that the incumbent firm invests early while in 
Proposition 5c access prices under ODPR are the minimum prices such that the incumbent firm 
invests at   when demand is high. The proofs of Propositions 5a to 5c are in the Appendix.   1 = t
 
Proposition 5a: When the unregulated market is characterised by one of the following 
conditions: (i)    and (ii)  ,  ,   and  0
____ ______
= = OD NPV
____ ______
OD NPV = 0 >












the ODPR generates the same overall welfare than the ECPR.  
 
Proposition 5b: Suppose the unregulated market is characterised by one of the following 
conditions: (i)  , (ii) there is an expected demand level Q such that 
,   and  , and the actual expected demand 
 i s  s u c h  t h a t   ,  ,   and  , (iii) there is an expected 
demand   such that 
0
____ ______













































, and the actual expected demand is 
such that  ,   and OD and (iv)  ,  , 
and  . When the potential entrant is less efficient than the incumbent and 
, the ODPR generates the same overall welfare as an unregulated 





* * p p ≤





() c c c E E ≥ + 2 1
____ ______
OD NPV = 0 >
+ OD
( ) c Z c E c c c c E + + < + ≤ + 1 2 1 2 1 2 , the ODPR generates higher overall 
welfare than an unregulated industry that is not required to provide access. When the potential 
entrant is more efficient than the incumbent (i.e., ( ) ( ) 2 c 1 c 2 1 c c E E + < + ) the ODPR generates 
higher overall welfare than the ECPR. In addition, the ODPR-based access price is lower than the 
ECPR-based access price.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
13 In order to avoid exclusionary conduct, this methodology must be applied in combination with an 
imputation test which assures that the incumbent firm will charge retail consumers a price greater than or 
equal to the cost of providing the service. 
  25Proposition 5c:  Suppose the unregulated market is characterised by one of the following 
conditions: (i)  ,  ,   and 
____ ______
OD NPV = 0 >











, (ii) there is an expected 
demand level Q such that  ,   and  ,and  
the actual expected demand Q is such that  ,  ,   and   
and (iii)  ,  ,  and  . When the potential entrant is less 
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+ ≥ 2 2
c
, the ODPR generates a lower or equal overall 
welfare than an unregulated industry that is not required to provide access. When the potential 
entrant is less efficient than the incumbent and  Z c c E + < ≤ 2 2 2 , the ODPR generates higher 
overall welfare than an unregulated industry that is not required to provide access if 
where 


















































* * * p . When the potential entrant is 
more efficient than the incumbent (i.e.,  < ) the ODPR generates higher overall welfare 
than the ECPR if  where 


















































* * * . In addition, the 
ODPR-based access price is lower than the ECPR-based access price. 
 
Proposition 5a characterises the market conditions where access prices under the ODPR and 
ECPR are identical. Under such conditions the ODPR generates the same welfare as the ECPR. 
Proposition 5b characterises the market conditions where access prices under ODPR are the 
minimum prices such that the incumbent firm still invests early. In this case, there are three 
possible outcomes under Bertrand competition between the incumbent and (infinitely many) 
potential entrants.  
 
First, when the entrant is less efficient than the incumbent and ( )( )Z c c c c E E + + ≥ + 2 1 2 1 , the 
entrant can only offer retail prices above the choke prices. As a consequence, the incumbent 
  26serves the market at the choke prices. Welfare under the ODPR is equivalent to an unregulated 
market and also to the ECPR.  Second, when the entrant is less efficient than the incumbent and 
() ( ) () Z c c c c c c E E + + < + ≤ + 2 1 2 1 2 1  the threat of entry leads the incumbent to reduce its 
prices such that  ( ) ( ) E
ODPR
E c A 2 2 1 + +
ODPR E E c A P P 1 2 1 + = +
() ( ) 2 1 2 1 c c c c E E + < +
 and  . Under this 
condition the incumbent still serves the entire market under the ODPR. However, since the retail 
prices under ODPR are lower than the choke prices and the incumbent firm still invests early, this 
access regulation generates a higher welfare than the unregulated market and also the ECPR. In 
fact, under the ECPR potential entry only impacts prices when the entrant is more efficient than 
the incumbent. Third, when the potential entrant is more efficient then the incumbent, that is, 
 the incumbent cannot offer the same price conditions as the entrant’s and 
consequently the entrant serves the market. Since access prices under the ODPR are lower than 
under the ECPR, retail prices under the former regulation are lower than those under the latter 
regulation as well. In fact, when the entrant serves the market retail prices are equal to the sum of 




1 2 1 P P P P
E E + < +
0 = t
1
 under both access regulations. 
Thus, ODPR generates higher welfare than the ECPR.  
 
Proposition 5c characterises the market conditions where access prices under ODPR are the 
minimum prices such that the incumbent firm invests at  = t
0
 when demand is high – recall that 
under the ECPR the incumbent firm always invest at  = t .  There are also three possible cases. 










 the entrant can only 
offer a retail price above the choke price  . As a consequence, the incumbent serve the market 
at the choke price. Note that in this case the welfare under the ODPR is equal to  . We 
know that in an unregulated market welfare is given by  . Also, our benchmark is a 
monopolist firm that invests at  , that is,  . Thus, if  , the ODPR 
generates the same welfare than an unregulated industry and when  , the ODPR 













E c P = 2 2
, 
the threat of entry leads the incumbent to reduce its price such that   and 
. Note that the incumbent still serves the market but this access regulation extracts part 
of the firm’s profit, transferring it to the consumer surplus. In this case we will have an optimality 
rule that will depend on 
_
2 2 P P
E <
α  and  p . Under the ODPR consumer surplus is positive while in an 
  27unregulated market it is zero. However, the incumbent firm invests at  0 = t  in an unregulated 
market and at   in case demand turns out to be high under the ODPR. Then, the ODPR will 
be optimal only if the probability of the high demand state is larger than 
1 = t
*** p . Note that the 
denominator of   is the sum of the consumer surplus and the incumbent’s profit under the 
ODPR. This surplus (weighted by the probability of the high demand state 
* * * p
p ) must be larger 
than the firm’s profit in an unregulated market weighted by α  -- the amount that is lost when the 
firm delays its investment – to be socially optimal to have investment at  1 t =  as induced by an 
ODPR-based access price. 
 
Third, when the potential entrant is more efficient then the incumbent (i.e.,  ), both the 
incumbent’s and entrant’s profits are equal to zero. In this case, the entire profit is transferred to 
the consumer surplus. However, as in the previous case under the ECPR the incumbent firm 
invests at   and under the ODPR at 
2 c < 2 c E
0 = t 1 = t  in case demand turns out to be high. Once more, 
the ODPR will be optimal only if the probability of the high demand state is larger than 
**** p . Note 
that the denominator of   is the consumer surplus under the ODPR. This surplus (weighted 
by the probability of the high demand state 
* * * * p
p ) must be larger than the sum of the consumer 
surplus generated by lower retail prices and the firm’s profit weighted by α  under the ECPR -  
the amount that is lost when the firm delays its investment – for an ODPR-based access price to 
be optimal. 
 
Thus, we have shown that the ODPR generates (weakly) higher welfare than the ECPR, except 
under very specific circumstances.  The main reason is that under an option-to-delay pricing rule, 
even an inefficient entrant can constraint the monopoly rents that the incumbent can extract, 




In this paper we examine a simple three-period investment model in a network industry 
characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In this model a firm 
may invest in the first period or wait until the second period to decide whether to invest in the 
network.  
 
This paper differs from the earlier literature in that it explicitly determines the optimal price 
regulation when investments are sunk and irreversible. In general, whether optimal regulated 
prices should incorporate an option to delay value will depend on demand conditions.  
  28 
In particular, in the absence of retail competition, there are three possible optimal scenarios: 
regulated prices that provide a zero payoff to the firm, regulated prices that include an option to 
delay value and provide a positive payoff to the firm and no regulation. From a policy perspective, 
this indicates that regulated prices that exclude an option to delay and that are designed to yield 
zero economic profits might not be optimal.  
 
When retail competition is possible, we show that an access price that incorporates an option to 
delay value (ODPR) often yields higher welfare than the ECPR. This contrasts with Pindyck 
(2004) who found that when there is entry the entrant’s expected gain is identical to the 
incumbent’s expected loss. Pindyck suggests that in order to account for the option to delay value 
the access price should be set according to an ECPR-based methodology; the price at which the 
incumbent would be indifferent between providing access to entrants or providing the retail 
service itself. At this price, the entrant’s expected cash flow would be set equal to zero. In 
contrast, when entry is possible in our model, the entrant’s expected gain in equilibrium is equal 
to zero - this follows from the assumption of a perfectly elastic supply of entrants - and the 
incumbent’s expected loss equals the expected increase in consumer surplus. In this 
environment and under most circumstances, the ODPR-based access price, which is lower or 
equal than the ECPR is sufficient to provide the appropriate investment incentives and generates 
at least the same welfare. It is also important to note that in contrast with the ECPR methodology, 
under ODPR-based access price the potential entrant constrains the monopoly power of the 
vertically integrated firm even when the entrant is less efficient than the incumbent. In this case, 
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Appendix  
 
Proof of Lemma 1: In a risk-neutral world, all assets would earn the risk-free return r , and so 
expected cash flows (weighted by the risk-neutral probabilities,  p and  ) could be 
appropriately discounted at the risk-free rate. Note that in this case the investment outlay to build 
the network at   is equal to  . 
( p − 1 )
1 = t () I r + 1
 
Likewise, it is easy to see that in a risk-neutral world the expected return on the investment must 
equal the risk-free rate, that is,   
 
( ) 1. pRp R
+− r + −=  
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  31Proof of Lemma 2: The graphs below (Figures 3 to 7) show payoff associated with investment 
decisions where   and   are functions of Q. These figures were constructed using the 




2 P 1 c
______
NPV
2 c I , r ,   and  . However, each figure is draw with a different value 






Figure 3 below shows that if   then   for all values of expected demand 











Q 0 = t  because the first period cash 


























Investment Decision  Condition  
The firm never invests if  0
____
= OD  
The firm invests at   if  1 = t uQ q = 1 ,   and    0 >
+ OD 0 =
− OD
The firm always invests at  1 = t  if  0 >
+ OD  and    0 >
− OD
Table 2 
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If  , the first period net revenue is always equal to zero and then   for all 





























Note that when Q is such that  , the firm would invest at  0 >
− OD 1 = t  in all states of demand. 
Thus, in this case the firm is indifferent between investing at  0 = t
0
 and at  . Table 3 below 











Investment Decision  Condition  
The firm never invests if  0
____
= OD  
The firm invests at   if   1 = t uQ q = 1 ,   and    0 >
+ OD 0 =
− OD
The firm is indifferent between investing  at 
 or at   (and we will assume that the 
firm invests at  ) if 
0 = t 1 = t
0 = t
0 > OD 0 > OD NPV =





  33If   then N or a sufficiently large Q. Moreover, under this condition there 
are three possible cases that basically depend on the magnitude of  ⎟ ⎜ − 1 1 c P . We will proceed to 
























In the first case, there is a Q such that  ,   and   (Figure 5). 
For all expected demand larger or equal than that  ,   and as a consequence the 
firm will invest at  . 
0
____ ______





















Table 4 below summarizes the investment decision outputs: 
 
Investment Decision  Condition  
The firm never invests if  0
____
= OD  
The firm invests at   if  1 = t










The firm invests at   if   0 = t
____ ______
OD NPV ≥ ,   and     0 >
+ OD 0 ≥
− OD
Table 4 
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In the second case   for the large expected demand Q, named  , such that 
 (Figure 6). Once more, for all expected demand larger or equal than Q ,   


























Table 5 below summarizes the investment decision outputs: 
 
Investment Decision  Condition  
The firm never invests if  0
____
= OD  and   
____ ______
OD NPV <
The firm invests at   if   0 = t 0
____ ______
≥ ≥ OD NPV  
Table 5 
 
In the third situation there is a   such that    (Figure 7). Once more, for all 
expected demand larger or equal tha Q D and as a consequence the firm will 
invest at t




= = OD NPV
____
O ≥   , 
______
NPV
















Note that the investment decision outputs are also given by Table 5 above. ￿ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: If   there is no need for regulation as the best the 
regulator can do is to replicate the unregulated market outcomes by setting   and 
. Indeed, if the regulator sets the regulated prices below market levels the firm will not 
invest. If   then the regulator can set, for instance, 
0
____ ______
= = OD NPV
0 =
_
1 1 P P
R =
_




( 1 c C + + = )
_





1 1 P P
R − =  and   such that we have  . In 











































































1 α      (9) 
 
The welfare obtained with this regulatory policy must be compared to the unregulated market 
welfare. The difference between (9) and (4) is equal to () . This is the optimal  0 1
______
> − NPV α
  36regulation since these are the minimum prices that induce the firm to invest in the network facility. 
￿ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2a: Suppose there is an expected demand Q such that 
 and the actual expected demand is such that 
,   and  . In this case it is easy to see that the regulator is able to 
extract the entire profit from the firm and it will still invest at 
%
__ __
12 12 (, ,) (, ,) 0 NPV P P Q OD P P Q = %
____ ______





0 = t . This price setting is   
and 
_
1 1 P P
R =
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NPV
P c P Q
Q
NPV










2 α      (10) 
 
The welfare obtained with this regulatory policy must be compared to the unregulated market 
welfare. It can be seen that the difference between (10) and (4) is equal to . This 
is the optimal regulation since these are the minimum prices that induce the firm to invest in the 
network facility. ￿ 
() 0 1
______
> − NPV α
 
Proof of Proposition 2b: Suppose there is an expected demand Q such that 




















1 , , , , Q P P OD Q P P NPV 0 >
+ OD 0 =
− OD
 
When   we have      and  . Under this scenario an 







+ OD 0 =
− OD




On one hand, since   the minimum regulated prices that induce investment at 
____ ______
OD NPV = 0 = t  
are   and  . Indeed, it is easy to see that any price setting below market levels 
_





  37induces the firm to invest at   if demand turns out to be high or even to not invest. In this 










On the other hand, the minimum regulated prices that induce investment at   if demand turns 
out to be high is   and  . If the regulator were to set   then 
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R = 2 c CH + = 2 c
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When   is such that  ,   and  , the minimum regulated prices that 
induce investment at    are    and    such that  . As 
 and   we have 2 c . Then, there is 0 > , such 
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  (12) 
 
On the other hand, the minimum regulated prices that induce investment at   if demand turns 
out to be high are   and  . In this case the overall welfare is given by (11).   
= t
_
1 1 P P
R = 2 c CH + =
Then, the price setting   and   is optimal when   1 P
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>
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  38Proof of Preposition 3a: Suppose there is an expected demand Q such that 
 and the actual expected demand Q is such that 
,   and  . It is easy to see that the optimal prices are the same as 
in Proposition 2a since the regulator is able to extract all the rents from the firm while it still 
invests at  . ￿ 
%
__ __
12 12 (, ,) (, ,) 0 NPV P P Q OD P P Q = %
____ ______







 Proof of Preposition 3b: Suppose there is an expected demand   such that 
,   and   and the actual expected demand 
 is such that  ,   and  . As seen in Proposition 2b, the minimum 

































= t  is    and   such that 
 and the total welfare under these prices at 
_
1 1 P P
R = M c C P H




OD OD NPV < = = t
1
 is given by (12). On the 
other hand, the minimum regulated prices that induce investment at  = t  if demand turns out to 
be high is   and  . In this case the overall welfare is equal to (11). The 
optimal strategy rule is the same as the one included in Proposition 2b. ￿ 
_
1 1 P P
R = 2 C P H
R = 2 c +
 
Proof of Preposition 3c: Suppose  ,   and Q are such that  ,   
and  . On one hand, the minimum regulated prices that induce investment at 
1
_




OD NPV = 0 >
+ OD
0 0 >
− OD = t  is  
 and   such that  .
_
1 P = 1 P
R
_
2 2 2 P c C P L
R < + =
____
OD < = OD NPV
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2 α              (13) 
 
On the other hand, the minimum regulated prices that induce investment at   if demand turns 
out to be high is   and P . In this case the overall welfare is given by (11). 
These prices are optimal when  
1 = t
_
1 1 P P
R = 2 2 c CH
R + =
 
                                                 






























































Table 6 below shows the different access prices under ODPR. We will proceed to characterize 
welfare under this access regulation.  






= = OD NPV 1
_
1 1 c P A
ODPR − = 2
_
2 2 c P A
ODPR − =    and   
2  0
____ ______
= > OD NPV
_
2 2 1 P c C A
ODPR − + = 2
_
2 2 c P A
ODPR − =    and   
3 
____





1 1 c P A
ODPR − = 2
_




1 1 c P A
ODPR − = H
ODPR C A = 2
______
, OD  and OD  
 and   
or 
 and   
4 
____ ______





1 1 c P A
ODPR − = M C A H
ODPR + = 2
1
_
1 1 c P A
ODPR − = H
ODPR C A = 2
NPV , OD  and OD  
 (Figure 5) 
 and   
or 








1 1 c P A
ODPR − =
_
1 1 2 P c C A
ODPR − + =
______
> NPV , OD  and OD  
 (Figure 7) 
 and   
6 
____ ______
OD NPV = 0 >
+ 0 >
−
, OD  and OD  
1
_
1 1 c P A
ODPR − =  and    L




1 1 c P A
ODPR − =  and    H
ODPR C A = 2
Table 6 
 
Propositions 4 and 5a are straightforward. We proceed to demonstrate Proposition 5b. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5b: Table 7 below shows the three possible outcomes under Bertrand 












2 P    and     Incumbent 
() ( ) () Z c c c c c c + + < + ≤ + E E 2 1 2 1 2 1    
E P 1
E P2  and   such that 
( ) ( ) E
ODPR
E
ODPR E E c A c A P P 2 2 1 1 2 1 + + + = +  
Incumbent 
() c c c < + ( )
E P 1
E P2
2 1 2 1 c E E +  
 and   such that 
( ) ( ) E
ODPR
E




We will proceed to characterise welfare under the ECPR. Note first that under this access 
regulation the incumbent always invest at  0 = t . Note also that under the ECPR, entry only 
occurs when  . So, when  () ( 2 1 2 1 c c c c E E + < + ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 2 1 c c c c E E + ≥ + , the welfare generated 
by the ECPR and by an unregulated market are equivalent. On the other hand, when 

























     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } Q c A P c A P I Q A A E
ECPR ECPR
E
ECPR ECPR ECPR ECPR
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 + − + + − + − + +α  (14) 
 
Now, we proceed to analyse the ODPR. When the entrant is less efficient than the incumbent and 
 it is easy to see that the entrant can only offer retail prices above the 
choke prices. As a consequence, the incumbent serve the market at the choke prices. Welfare 
under the ODPR is equivalent to an unregulated market. When the potential entrant is less 
efficient than the incumbent and 
() ( ) Z c c c c E E + + ≥ + 2 1 2 1
() ( ) ( ) Z c c c c c c E E + + < + ≤ + 2 1 2 1 2 1
0
 the ODPR creates the 
following overall expected welfare function at  = t : 
     
() () [] {} I Q c P c P Q P P P P W
E E E E




















1 α    (15) 
When () ( ) () Z c c c c c c E E + + < + ≤ + 2 1 2 1 2 1
()( ) ( ) () 0 2 1 2 1 > + − + + Q c c c c Z E E
, we must compare the ODPR with the unregulated 
monopoly case. The difference between (15) and (4) is equal to 
1−α .  
 
  41When the potential entrant is more efficient then the incumbent (i.e., ( )( ) 2 1 2 1 c c c c E E + < + ), 
ODPR yields the following overall expected welfare function at  0 = t : 
























     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } Q c A P c A P I Q A A E
ODPR E
E
ODPR E ODPR ODPR
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 + − + + − + − + +α  (16) 
 
In this case, we compare the ODPR with the ECPR. The difference between (16) and (14) is 
equal to () 0 1 > − ZQ α . ￿ 
Proof of Proposition 5c: We will proceed to analyse the cases where   and 
. The incumbent does not know the entrant’s costs. So, under this policy the firm will 
invest at   only if demand turns out to be high. Also, we can define    
where  . Table 8 below shows the three possible outcomes under Bertrand competition 
between the incumbent and (infinitely many) potential entrants: 
1
_
1 1 c P A
ODPR − =














Z c E + ≥ 2
_
2 P c2      Incumbent 
Z c + < 2 c c E ≤ 2 2    
E P2  such that    H E
E C c P + = 2 2 Incumbent 
2 2 c c E <  
E P2  such that    H E
E C c P + = 2 2 Entrant 
Table 8 
 
When the entrant is less efficient than the incumbent and  Z c c E + ≥ 2 2  it is easy to see that the 
entrant can only offer a retail price above the choke price. As a consequence, the incumbent 
serves the market at the choke price. However, the incumbent only invests at   if demand is 
high. Thus, welfare under the ODPR is equal to  . We know that in an unregulated market 
welfare is given by  . We also know that under our benchmark the firm invests at 
1 = t
H
t p 1 = π α
______
NPV α 0 = t , 










When the potential entrant is less efficient than the incumbent and  Z c c c E + < ≤ 2 2 2
H E C + 2 2 P
E <
0
, the threat 
of entry leads the incumbent to reduce its prices such that   and  . In this 
case the ODPR creates the following overall expected welfare function at 
E c P = 2
_
2 P
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Once more, we must compare the ODPR with the unregulated monopoly case. The difference 
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When the potential entrant is more efficient then the incumbent (i.e.,  2 2 c c E < ), ODPR yields the 
following overall expected welfare function at  0 = t
()
 (note that the incumbent’s and entrant’s 
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The difference between (18) and (14) is positive only if 
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⎡ + − − +
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α
. ￿ 
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